Since the beginning of the year, the number of cities approaching us for cooperation has significantly increased.
The opening pitches are almost identical: the first slide of the PPT says, "Build a regional benchmark for the low-altitude economy"; the third slide states, "Plan to introduce three to five operating enterprises"; and the last slide reads, "Welcome to invest." Throughout the presentation, no one usually asks: What are we flying? Who is paying? Who manages the airspace?
We have a habit of asking one question first: Last month, whose aircraft actually flew here? The most common answer we hear is, "We are currently coordinating this."
A few days ago, I saw a set of data from a financial and urban research institute, which serves as a footnote to this perception: they collected the "15th Five-Year Plan" outlines from various regions. Out of 291 prefecture-level city plans, 257 included the low-altitude economy. During the "14th Five-Year Plan" period, this number was only 23.
In five years, it has increased elevenfold.
What lies between the four characters in the planning text and the real money at the hangar door? When operators visit a city to evaluate a project, what exactly should they look at? Today, we will sort out the pitfalls we have fallen into and the tuition we have paid. We will talk about the facts, not the people.
Let me add a note at the beginning. Previously, I discussed how to choose among several cities in the "City of Low Altitude." After that article was published, friends kept coming to me with various "city comparison charts," asking: Shenzhen has strong monetization, Guangzhou has a high density of enterprises, Hefei has a model, and Shanghai has comprehensive technology—which chart should we follow? The charts are all correct. But anyone in operations knows that maps are for others to look at. When truly deciding which city to go to, we never look at the map; we look at the following six things.
I. First, Classify the Cities
When I look at cities, I first divide them into two categories: some are suitable for "Low-Altitude +", while others are suitable for "+ Low-Altitude". In plain language—
"Low-Altitude +" cities have an aviation foundation: manufacturing, talent, airports, and supporting facilities. They treat the low-altitude sector as a pillar industry. Cities like Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Chengdu are aiming for industrial clusters.
"+ Low-Altitude" cities have a fundamental base in agriculture, cultural tourism, and food processing. For them, the low-altitude sector is not an independent industry but a tool—using drones to spray crops, using low-altitude perspectives to attract cultural tourism, and using general aviation to improve logistics efficiency.
This classification is particularly critical for operators because the operational services required by the two types of cities are completely different. The former requires high-density, normalized operations that can integrate into the system, competing on standards and efficiency. The latter requires single-point scenarios, seasonal, and event-based operations, competing on flexibility and cost. The staffing is different, the profit logic is different, and even the cost structures are reversed.
It is not to say that the latter cannot be done. It is that you cannot use the ledger of the former to calculate the business of the latter.
Cities choose the track, and operators choose the ledger. If the track is chosen incorrectly, the plan can still be revised in five years; if the ledger is calculated incorrectly, it will cause severe damage within a year.
II. Six Must-Sees on Site
When arriving in an unfamiliar city, our habit is to look at the PPT less and the site more. Specifically, we look at six things.
First, look at the airspace, not the documents.
The four characters "airspace reform" in the documents are worthless. What is valuable is: Has the test flight airspace been approved? Does normalized flight still require approval on a case-by-case basis? Has the military-civilian coordination mechanism been successfully implemented?
Yes, it is exactly the question at the beginning—"Last month, whose aircraft actually flew here on a normalized basis?" If they can answer, we continue the discussion. If they cannot, no matter how beautiful the text is, it is first recorded in the "to be verified" column, not the "opportunity" column.
Second, look at the scenario density, not the planned area.
The "XX square kilometers of low-altitude industrial park" in the plan is real estate language, not operational language. What operations need are three numbers: Where are the customers? How many sorties can be flown in a year? How much can be charged per sortie? Multiply the three numbers and subtract the fixed costs, and you will see the true face of this business.
If the density is insufficient, subsidies cannot fill the gap. The principle is the same as farming—if nothing grows in the field, it is useless to build a beautiful greenhouse.
Let me add an account of the site: do not just focus on newly built take-off and landing points. A mall in Shanghai was equipped with a rooftop helipad at the beginning of its construction, and it has now become the preferred choice for low-altitude activities landing in the city center; a long-distance bus station still in operation in Guangzhou did not demolish the building or change the land plot, but directly "changed the core" to become a low-altitude complex—open space, location, and transfer network, all ready to use. According to public reports, the local highway passenger daily traffic fell from 330,000 to 25,000 over ten years. The space remained unchanged, but the business it carried changed a generation. The best take-off and landing points are often not built, but revitalized.
Third, look at the people who pay, not the people who stand on the stage.
It does not matter who cuts the ribbon. Opening ceremonies and foundation laying ceremonies are one-time events; once the photos are posted, the page is turned. What matters is: Who signs the contract? Where does the money come from? How many years is the contract signed for?
Be wary of demand propped up purely by financial subsidies—if the subsidy is there, the project is there; if the subsidy stops, the project dies. Real demand is when customers are willing to pay without relying on subsidies. The method of identification is simple: ask a question, what proportion of the revenue structure comes from the market.
Specific answers indicate a real business; vague answers indicate real danger.
Fourth, look at the exit clauses, not the park entry incentives.
Three years of rent-free, decoration subsidies, and settlement rewards—these sweeteners are all written on the first page of the contract. Our habit is to turn directly to the last page: how is the equipment deposit calculated, who pays for the decoration restoration, what is the standard for liquidated damages, and how to withdraw the personnel.
Last time I talked about the parking account of parked aircraft: why mobile hangars cannot save transit operations, I mentioned: the biggest advantage of transit operations is "being able to leave." If you sign a contract that prevents you from leaving, no hangar can save you.
Before entering the door, first see where the door is.
Fifth, see if there are "people who can fix it" locally.
Aircraft will break down, and batteries will degrade—this is a law of physics, not an attitude problem. Within 30 kilometers locally, is there maintenance capability? Are there spare parts channels? Taking a step back, are there qualified aircraft mechanics?
For projects without a maintenance radius, a minor fault means three days of grounding. Three days of grounding messes up the payment terms completely and leads to customer loss. This account dictates that many projects are destined to lose money on the day of signing, it is just that the parties involved do not know it yet.
Sixth, look at the platform, not the big screen.
Almost every city is building a low-altitude platform, with a wide variety of names. Do not look at the ten-meter big screen; ask two simple questions: Who is building this platform? Who is paying for it after it is built?
If the government purchases services based on flight sorties, it is a practical approach, and we can continue the discussion; if there is only a big screen and an annual operation and maintenance fee, and it is unclear who will support it, that is another story—a lesson from the past, CCTV just exposed it: tens of millions of CNY were poured in, and the daily active users were in the double digits.
Whether the platform runs airspace coordination for you or is just for leaders to look at determines whether every take-off of yours in this city goes smoothly.
III. Three Pitfall-Avoidance Experiences
The following three points are accumulated from the pitfalls we have fallen into ourselves and exchanges with peers. As usual, no names will be mentioned.
Pitfall 1: Hot signing, cold landing. When signing the contract, it is lively and enthusiastic; half a year later, the contact person has been transferred, the project is frozen in place, and there is not even a person who can make a decision to be found. There is only one countermeasure: write the docking mechanism and time nodes firmly in the contract. Black and white is more reliable than personal relationships.
Pitfall 2: Scenarios are "assembled." The scenario list temporarily assembled for project declaration has about a dozen items, and it is scattered after acceptance. Countermeasure: Require to see the real operational data of the scenario over the past several months. If they cannot provide it, it shows that the scenario only lives in the PPT.
Pitfall 3: Treating subsidies as revenue. Treating government money entirely as market revenue for budgeting; once the grain is cut off, the whole system shuts down. The countermeasure is to draw a dividing line:
G-end revenue with government procurement contracts can be counted as revenue; subsidies without contracts can only be counted as surprises. Subsidies go into the "profit" column, never into the "cost coverage" column.
Final Words
Back to the number 257. Nearly 90% of cities have written the low-altitude economy into their plans. We are not pessimistic; instead, we think it is a good thing—the demand side is waking up, and the market is growing.
But between the text and the business, there are the six things mentioned above. We do not pour cold water; we are just used to calculating the accounts first. What this industry lacks most is not people who believe in it, but people who can calculate the accounts clearly.
There is one more thing worth mentioning: now even people in real estate and commercial complexes have entered the field to calculate accounts, starting with "how long it takes to recoup the investment for a take-off and landing point." The ruler is not wrong, but the order is reversed—first answer "whether this place can fly tomorrow and how many sorties it can fly," and then the question of recouping the investment makes sense. The six things that stand between the text and the business cannot be bypassed.
In five years, how many low-altitude industries will be left among the 257 cities does not depend on how beautifully today's planning texts are written—it depends on how many operators have calculated the accounts correctly and flown the aircraft safely for one year after another.
—Written at the beginning of the "15th Five-Year Plan," to encourage all peers who calculate accounts at the hangar door.
Taking off is a capability; staying is a skill.
—This article was first published on the WeChat official account "Jingzhe: Summer by the Xiaoxiao River"—When reprinting, please indicate the source. Supporting originality and protecting originality is everyone's responsibility.